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This paper provides empirical evidence on the Demarzo, Fishman and Hagerty (2004) 
Self-regulation and Government Oversight model through an economic experiment. The 
model predicts that, for some parameterisations of the model, self-regulation organisations on 
the securities market set higher regulation than needed in order to pre-empt governmental 
intervention. In order to experimentally test this theoretical outcome, I derive a game with 2 
players and 2 actions from the model and run an experiment with 30 participants, which has 
confirmed the predictions of the model.  
Moreover, I also test a side-hypothesis that experiment participants perform differently 
when choosing between column and row strategies. The experimental results do not support 







Tato práce se snaží pomocí ekonomického experimentu poskytnout empirické důkazy 
modelu Samoregulace a vládního dohledu, který sestrojili Demarzo, Fishman a Hagerty 
(2004). Při jistých parametrizacích tohoto modelu samoregulační organizace na trhu cenných 
papírů vykonávají více regulace, než je třeba, s úmyslem odradit vládu od vstupu na tento trh 
s regulací. Pro tyto účely byl model transformován na hru se dvěma hráči a dvěma 
strategiemi, na jejichž základě byl vykonán ekonomický experiment s 30 účastníky, jenž 
potvrdil zmiňovaný závěr modelu. 
Dále byla podrobena zkoumání hypotéza, že se účastníci experimentu chovají jinak, 
když volí své strategie mezi sloupci, a jinak, když je volí mezi řádky. Provedený experiment 
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In an attempt to theoretically understand the issues of self-regulation and Government 
oversight, DeMarzo, Fishman and Hagerty (2004, hereinafter referred to as DFH) model the 
interactions among four different players on the securities market. They analyse the behaviour 
of agents (securities brokers), customers (investors), a self-regulatory organization (SRO) 
with some regulatory authority on the market representing the agents, and the Government, 
which defends the interests of customers by also regulating the market. An example of an 
SRO is the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, which is the largest organisation of this 
kind in the US. The authors find that, when deciding how to regulate markets, under certain 
parameterisations of the model, the SRO will impose and enforce higher self-regulation than 
what the agent would prefer in order to pre-empt Government regulation of the market. In 
other words, the SRO tries to pre-empt Government action.  
In this paper I select a parameterisation of the DFH model that implements a particular 
outcome of the model in line with the aforementioned prediction. I design and implement an 
experiment that focuses on the behaviour of the SRO and the Government. I test the 
hypothesis that under certain parameterisations the SRO will impose and enforce regulation to 
pre-empt the Government from high market regulation.  
To the best of my knowledge, as of now neither an experimental test of the DFH 
model nor experiments studying the behaviour of an SRO attempting to stave off Government 
regulation have been conducted.  
In the paper I also explore whether the behaviour of experimental participants differs 
when the play as columns or rows players. 
This thesis is organized as follows: In Section 1 I introduce the topic and describe the 
DFH model. In Section 2 I explain the experimental design. In Section 3 I provide a 
description of the experimental implementation. Section 4 analyses the results of the 
experiment and Section 5 interprets them in a concluding discussion. Section 6 lists the 
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1.1. The DFH Model 
 
In the DFH model, customers hire agents to carry out financial transactions on the 
securities market for them. The outcome of the transaction is a binary random variable W 
with the support {w1, w2}, where w2 > w1 ≥ 0. Let πi denote the probability that W = wi. 
When the agent observes the realized cash flow W, he faces the moral hazard of reporting the 
true realization or lying to the customer. The reported cash flow is denoted r and can take on 
the values {w1, w2}. The contract between the customer and agent is represented by a function 
z, where z(r) specifies the payment from the agent to the customer if the agent reports that the 
realized cash flow is r.  
If the agent and the customer do not agree on a contract, the agent receives the pay-off 
0 and the customer an alternative opportunity pay-off worth α. The model assumes 
heterogeneous customers, which means that their alternative pay-offs are not constant. Let αi 
denote customer i’s alternative pay-off and let F(α) represent the fraction of the customer 
population with opportunity cost below α. 
The SRO can investigate the agent’s reporting at a cost c. The investigation takes 
place with probability ps(r) and the SRO sets a transaction fee ts to fund its investigation 
activities net of penalties, which is paid by the customer to participate in the market. The 
investigation always reveals the true realization of the cash flow. Based on the investigation 
result, the SRO may impose a monetary penalty on the agent xs, where xs(w,r) ≥ 0. 
Anticipating the behaviour of the customers, agents and the Government, the SRO chooses its 
enforcement policy (ps, xs, ts) to maximize the agent’s expected utility. The agent’s utility 
function u(y) is increasing, concave and u(0) = 0. 
After the SRO sets its enforcement policy, the Government enters the model, with the 
possibility to set its own enforcement policy to maximize the customers’ expected pay-off. 
The Government can set its own investigation probability pg(r), which adds up with ps(r) to 
create the final probability of the agent being investigated p(r) (p = pg + ps)
1. The Government 
conducts an investigation with the cost cg, where cg ≥ c
2. Moreover, the Government can set a 
penalty xg which overrides the penalty xs and a transaction fee tg to cover its costs net of 
                                               
1 This definition implies the following realization of the investigation. First the SRO investigates the fraction of 
the agents, according to the probability of investigation. Further on, the Government does the same thing, but 
excludes the agents investigated by the SRO. Therefore, the two probabilities can add up; no agent will be 
investigated twice. 
2 This assumption reflects the fact that SROs have more experience with investigation and are closer to the 
subjects. 
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penalties (neither the Government nor the SRO make any profit, they use the transaction fees 
only to cover their costs). 
Finally, the customer has to pay a transaction fee t (t = tg + ts) to participate in the 
market. The agents face an investigation probability p(r) and the threat of a penalty xg. The 
timing of the model is as follows: 
 
1. The SRO chooses an enforcement policy and transaction fee (ps, xs, ts). 
2. Taking the SRO’s enforcement policy and transaction fee (ps, xs, ts), as given, the 
Government chooses its enforcement policy and transaction fee (pg, xg, tg). 
3. Taking the overall enforcement policy, (ps + pg, xg, ts + tg), as given, the customer 
either takes the alternative pay-off αi, in which case the agent’s pay-off is 0, or the 
customer offers a contract z to the agent. If the customer offers a contract, then the 
problem continues.  
4. If the agent rejects the contract, the agent receives 0 and the customer receives αi. If 
the agent accepts the contract, the customer pays ts + tg and the problem continues. 
5. The agent privately observes the realization of the cash flow w, chooses a cash flow, r, 
to report and pays the customer z(r). 
6. Given the report r, the agent is investigated with probability p(r). If the SRO 
investigates the agent, the SRO pays c. If the Government investigates the agent, the 
Government pays cg. In either case, the agent pays the penalty xg(w,r) (subject to 
his/her resource constraint).  
 
1.2. Conclusions of DFH 
 
The most important result for the following experiment is that, under certain 
parameterisations, during the enforcement policy setting process the threat of Government 
enforcement leads to higher enforcement by the SRO than what agents would prefer, just 
enough to pre-empt any Government enforcement.  
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• There is no cheating in equilibrium. This is secured by the agent’s incentive compatibility 
constraint (AIC). If the AIC doesn’t hold, then the customer doesn’t offer the agent a 
contract. The AIC’s formulation is: 
u(w2 – z(w2)) ≥ p(w1)u(max[w2 – z(w1) – xg(w2, w1),0]) + (1 - p(w1))u(w2 – z(w1)) 
• p(w2) = 0, if the agent reports the high cash flow, then there is no need of investigation, 
the agent cannot be lying 
• x(w1,w1) = 0, if the agent is not lying, then the penalty equals 0 
• ts = π1ps(w1)c, tg = π1pg(w1)cg, the transaction fee equals the cost of investigations 
multiplied by the probability of investigation and the probability of the state (both of the 
low cash flow) 
 
 
2. Experimental Design 
 
2.1. Players and Actions 
 
In my experiment, I study the behaviour of two of the players featured in the DFH 
model, the SRO and the Government. In particular, I study how they set their enforcement 
policies. This interactive decision-making is modelled by a simultaneous game, where each 
player can choose from two actions – setting either a low or a high probability of 
investigation. After the subjects make their choice, the outcome is determined by adding up 
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Figure 1 depicts the four possible outcomes of the designed game. Outcome 1 includes 
low, Outcomes 2 and 3 medium and Outcome 4 high total probability of investigation. It is 
also important to consider not only the final probability of investigation but also the subject, 
which conducts the investigation. This is crucial, because the Government and the SRO have 
different investigation costs, therefore their transaction fees differ, and therefore a different 
number of customers is attracted based on who is the investigator (this is a result of the 
heterogeneous customer model assumption in the DFH). 
For the chosen parameterisation, the conclusion of the DFH model is that Outcome 3 
will take place, i.e., the SRO will choose a high probability of investigation and the 
Government will choose a low probability of investigation, leaving most of the regulation to 
the SRO. 
A simple game with 2 players that have 2 actions is a huge simplification of the real 
decision-making of the SRO and the Government. One can ask why should the players not 
have more, maybe even continuous options? This is essentially an experiment design choice. 
This simple 2-player, 2-action game is transparent plus experimental economists have 
traditionally argued that theories that do not survive experimental tests in simple experimental 
designs are likely to have problems in more complicated models.  
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The simultaneity of the designed game is another questionable assumption. However, 
in reality the two subjects make decisions at the same time and have to anticipate the next 
move of the other player, exactly as in the game I described above. 
      
2.2. Parameterisation 
 
To be able to experimentally tests the abovementioned game, concrete pay-offs have 
to be assigned for each player for every outcome. A parameterisation of the DFH model was 
used to calculate these values.  
I set the high probability to 0.5 and the low probability to 0.2 (the high and low 
probability concern only the situation when the low cash flow is reported p(w1), if the high 
realization of cash flow is reported there is no need to investigate, as stated in the DFH model 
section). Furthermore, the cash flow realisation W takes on the values w1 = 40 and w2 = 60. 
The probabilities that either of these cash flows occur are equal, i.e., π1 = π2 = 0.5. 
Investigation costs are c = 15 and cg = 35. The agents utility function is linear u(y) = y. The 
contract z gives the agents the pay-off of 20 in both cases, that is z(w1) = 20 and z(w2) = 40. 
Another assumption is that the Government always implements the highest possible penalty 
(with respect to the agent’s budget constraint, which is very realistic, because there is no 
moral reason for the agent keeping a part of the cash flow when he cheats), that is x(w2,w1) = 
w2 – z(w1) = 40. All the parameters are summarized in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Parameters 
Binary variables 
p(w1) – low 0.2 p(w1) - high 0.5 
w1 40 w2 60 
π1 0.5 π2 0.5 
c 15 cg 35 
z(w1) 20 z(w2) 40 
Other parameters 
u(y) = y 
x(w2,w1) = w2 – z(w1) = 40 
α = 15 
 
Concerning the customers’ alternative pay-offs, the customer with the best alternative 
pay-off will have the alternative pay-off equal to the expected pay-off of the contract (i.e., α1  
= π1z(w1)+ π2z(w)2 = 30) and the customer with the worst alternative pay-off will have the 
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alternative pay-off 0. Other customers will be equally distributed between the two and their 
pay-offs will decline linearly as in Figure 3. Therefore, the average expected pay-off of a 
customer would equal the best pay-off plus the worst pay-off, all divided by 2, which is 15. 
 
Figure 3: The Distribution of Customers  
 
2.3. Outcome 1 
 
I determine the pay-offs for each outcome based on the parameterisation. In the first 
outcome, both subjects use low regulation, that is ps(w1) = pg(w1) = 0.2 and p(w1) = 0.4. As 
regards the AIC in this outcome, we get the inequality: 
 
u(w2 – z(w2)) ≥ p(w1)u(max[w2 – z(w1) – x(w2, w1),0]) + (1 - p(w1))u(w2 – z(w1)) 
[ ](60 40) 0.4* (max 60 20 40,0 (1 0.4) (60 20)
20 24
u u u− ≥ − − + − −
≥  
 
Since the AIC does not hold in the first outcome (the probability of investigation is too 
low for the customers to accept the contract – they are afraid of being cheated), the customers 
accept their alternative pay-off 15 and the agents receive 0 (In all four cases I will assume that 
SRO represents one agent and the Government one customer. Due to the structure of the 
Customer with the best 
alternative pay-off 
Customer with the worst 
alternative pay-off 
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model, the number of players in each group is irrelevant, as long as the number is the same for 
both groups, the pay-offs would change only proportionally.) 
 
2.4. Outcome 2 
  
In the second outcome, the SRO implements low regulation and the Government high 
regulation. Therefore the sum is p(w1) = 0.7. In this case the AIC holds and therefore both 
parties receive pay-offs from trading with each other. The transaction fees are ts = π1 c ps(w1) 
= 0.5* 15 * 0.2 = 1.5 and tg = π1 cg pg(w1) = 0.5 * 35 * 0.5 = 8.75. The final Government pay-
off (which is the pay-off of one customer) will be the expected income from the deal minus 
the sum of the transaction fees. Thus the Government pay-off in the second outcome is GP2 = 
π1z(w1) + π2z(w2) – tg – ts = 0.5*20 + 0.5 * 40 – 1.5 – 8.75 = 19.75. 
It is slightly more difficult to compute the SRO’s pay-off. Once again, I assume one 
agent with his expected pay-off being the SRO’s pay-off, but this time the value is multiplied 
by the fraction of the market that will participate F(α). The borderline pay-off αb (customers 
with a higher alternative pay-off do not participate in the market) is the Government pay-off 
GP and the fraction F(GP) is equal to F(GP) = GP / (π1z(w1) + π2z(w2)). The last two 
assumptions (αb = GP and F(αb) = F(GP)) are based on the distribution of customers depicted 
in Figure 3. 
Under the conditions described in the paragraph above the SRO pay-off SP2 is 
calculated as the expected pay-off from the contract multiplied by the fraction of the 
customers participating, i.e., SP2 = F(GP2) * (π1(w1 - z(w1)) + π2(w2 - z(w2))) = 
(19.75/30)(0.5*20 + 0.5*20) = 13.2.   
 
2.5. Outcome 3 
 
In the third outcome, which is the outcome that is theoretically supported by the DFH 
model, the SRO chooses the high probability of investigation and the Government chooses the 
low probability of investigation, adding up to the total of p(w1) = 0.7. The AIC holds and 
therefore so far this outcome is identical with the second outcome. However, the difference 
between these two outcomes is that, since the majority of the investigation in the third 
outcome is done by the SRO, the investigation has lower costs, thus the transaction fees are 
lower as a result of which more customers are attracted and both parties receive higher pay-
offs.  
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The Government pay-off is computed identically to Outcome 2: GP3 = π1z(w1) + 
π2z(w2) – tg – ts = 0.5 * 20 + 0.5 * 40 – 3.5 – 3.75 = 22.75. 
To compute the SRO pay-off SP3, we use the same methodology as in Outcome 2: SP3 
= F(GP3) (π1(w1 - z(w1) + π2(w2 - z(w2)) = (22.75/30)*(0.5*20 + 0.5*20) = 15.2 
 
2.6. Outcome 4 
 
In the last outcome, both subjects choose to enforce high regulation, ps(w1) = pg(w1) = 
0.5, therefore p(w1) = 1. The AIC holds and the Government and SRO pay-offs are computed 
using the same steps as in Outcome 2 and 3: 
 
 GP4 = π1z(w1) + π2z(w2) – tg – ts = 0.5 * 20 + 0.5 * 40 – 8.75 – 3.75 = 17.5 
  
 SP4= F(GP4) (π1(w1 - z(w1) + π2(w2 - z(w2)) = (17.5/30)*(0.5*20 + 0.5*20) = 11.7 
 
2.7. The Specific Game 
 
Taking all the preceding computations into consideration and rounding off to whole 
numbers, the interactive decision-making situation to be tested experimentally is shown in 
Figure 4 (I will refer to this decision-making situation as the “DFH Game”; the numbers in 
the cells represent the pay-offs for both players if the given outcome is selected – the first 
number in each cell denotes the pay-off of the SRO and the second number denotes the pay-
off of the Government): 
 
















12 , 18 15 , 23 
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The DFH Game is an asymmetric coordination game with two pure-strategy Nash 
equilibria (grey cells) and one mixed equilibrium. In the mixed equilibrium, the SRO plays 
Low probability (LP) with 0.5 probability and High probability (HP) with 0.5 probability. On 
the other hand, the Government plays LP with the probability of 0.0625 and HP with the 
probability of 0.9375. As concerns the Nash equilibria, the darker grey cell (Outcome 3) is a 
both risk and pay-off dominant equilibrium. This outcome is also proposed by the underlying 
parameterisation of the DFH model and therefore it is likely to be the outcome that results 
from the experiment. 
There are several market forces in the DFH Game that drive the stated pay-offs for 
every outcome. First of all, customers require the probability of investigation to be high 
enough for the agents to be motivated not to cheat. This is represented by the AIC, which 
holds in Outcomes 2, 3 and 4 and does not hold in Outcome 1. Furthermore, both parties do 
not want excessive regulation. Excessive regulation increases transaction fees for customers, 
which lowers their net income leading to a smaller number of participants in the market which 
in turn results in lower net income of the agents. Finally, both groups also care about the 
composition of the provided regulation. Since investigation costs are higher for the 
Government than for the SRO, both agents and customers prefer if a larger portion of the 
investigation is done by the SRO. If more investigation is carried out by the SRO, customers 
profit, because the transaction fees are lower. Thanks to this, the agents profit, as more 
customers take part in the market.  
 
 
3. Experimental Implementation 
 
3.1. Experimental Environment 
 
The behaviour of players in the DFH Game was experimentally tested in a non-
computerized experiment with 30 participants recruited from students of economics3. The 
experiment took place in 2 sessions4 with 16 participants in the first session and 14 
participants in the second session. Upon the arrival of participants in each session, they were 
randomly seated and the instructions (See  6.2) were read aloud so that each participant knew 
that everyone had been given the same instructions. The instructions contained a 
comprehension question to make sure that each participant knew how to read the earnings 
                                               
3 CERGE-EI, VŠE and IES FSV UK students recruited through the web page www.experimenty.eu 
4 April 17, 2009; 16:00 and 19:00 
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tables. The comprehension question was checked by the experimenters and discussed with 
participants, if necessary. After the instructions were read, and all questions were answered, 
the participants were asked to mark their action choices in an experiment sheet (See  6.3 and 
 6.4).  
In the experiment, the participants were asked to play 7 games so that they would get 
familiar with the action selection process in this particular setting (see Hertwig & Ortmann 
20015). For the purposes of the experiment I developed 6 additional games which are 
described bellow and some of which are related to the DFH model. 
The DFH Game was one of the 7 games for which participants were asked to make 
action choices. In addition, they were asked to make action choices for each game both as the 
Row player and the Column player. Thus each participant made 14 action choices. In order 
not to tell the participants that they were playing each game twice (for example once as the 
SRO and once as the Government), the games were transformed in such a way that all 14 
action choices of each participant appeared either as decisions between rows or all 14 choices 
appeared as decision between columns. I will refer to this transformation below as 
transposition6. This resulted in 14 decisions for each player, with half of the players called 
Row Participants (with their choices presented to them as choice between rows) and the other 
half called Column Participants (with their choices presented to them as choice between 
columns). Nevertheless, all participants took the same 14 action choices (7 games as both 
players), the only difference being the layout of the games (choices between columns vs. 







                                               
5In this paper the authors argue that participants in an experiment experience a new environment when they enter 
the laboratory, which can affect their decision-making. Therefore, it is better to have them face several similar 
decision-making situations, which makes them adapt to the environment. This learning procedure is also 
supported by Weber (2000), whose experimental results suggest that learning takes place even during 
experiments with no feedback during a series of decisions. This is another reason for running more games than 
just one. If the key decisions are made after several other similar decisions, then the results should be more 
reliable. 
6  For the purposes of this paper, transposition is the following operation (players change positions in the game): 
 Player 2  Player 1 
a,b c,d b,a f,e 
Player 1 
e,f g,h 
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3.2. The Games 
 
Since every player played 7 different games in total, some of the other games were 
also designed to yield results directly related to the test of the DFH model. All 14 action 
choices are depicted in Figure 5. 















All 14 action choices were taken in the same manner as the DFH Game described 
above. Each game had two participants - Row Participant and Column Participant. The Row 
Participant could choose either the first or the second row as his or her strategy (labelled 
strategy A and B) and the Column Participant could choose either the first or the second 
column as his or her strategy (labelled strategy C and D). Whatever outcome took place after 
the strategies had been chosen, the Row Participant received a pay-off equal to the first 
 
 - 13 - 
 
 
number in the relevant cell and the Column Participant received a pay-off equal to the second 
number in the relevant cell, in both cases multiplied by 10 CZK. 
The first 7 games are the originally designed games. Games 1’ – 7’ are transpositions 
of games 1 – 7.  
Games 3, 5 and 7 depicted in Figure 4 are related to the DFH model and thus are 
significant for evaluating the DFH model (Naturally, so are the transposed relevant games 3’, 
5’ and 7’). Game 5 and 5’ (The DFH game) has already been discussed. Game 3 and 3’ 
changes the pay-off for Outcome 1, by adding 5 pay-off units for the Row Participant. This 
change can be intuitively justified with regard to the DFH model. In the DFH Game, Outcome 
1 represents the situation when the players do not agree on a contract and therefore the 
customer receives an average alternative pay-off 15 whereas the agent doesn’t receive 
anything. Thus, the customer can quite easily invest his money in a different deal, whereas the 
agent is established in his business, so he cannot shift easily to a different kind of business. 
Nevertheless, in Game 3 and 3’, I set an alternative where the agent is also capable to shift his 
activities to a different sector and earn some money. Of course, this shift would be much more 
costly for the agent and therefore I set his alternative pay-off to one third of the customer’s 
pay-off, which equals 5. Even though the game-theoretic characteristics of Game 3 stay the 
same as in Game 5, some participants in the experiment might consider this change and adjust 
their choices.  
Game 7 and 7’ represents an alternative parameterisation of the DFH model. For this 
game I changed one parameter of the model. In my first parameterisation, agents received 20 
for any kind of deal realized. In this alternative parameterisation I set the reward of 10 in the 
case that low cash flow takes place and a reward of 25 if high cash flow takes place, which 
copies a somewhat motivating scheme for agents to reach better results. After this 
arrangement both the pay-offs and the characteristics of the game changed. The Nash 
equilibrium is now in Outcome 1 when the low probability of investigation is implemented by 
both the SRO and the Government. This parameterisation offers a different theoretical 
prediction than the DFH Game, although of course, it is still derived from the DFH model.  
Having participants make decisions as Row and Column players allowed me to 
investigate across decisions whether being a Row player or a Column player makes a 
difference. Specifically, the 14 action choices were set up in such a way that both player types 
faced the same decision situation in the same order. For example, if Column participants 
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played the Prisoner’s Dilemma first, the Row participants would play the transposed 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game, etc. Thus every player underwent the series of decisions in the 
same order. The only difference was the layout of the games. The Row Participants made 
choices between rows, whereas the Column Participants made choices between columns. 
Thanks to this set-up it was possible to study also whether the lay-out of the games had any 
effect on the decision making of the subjects. 
In the experiment sheet the games were sequenced so that the games relevant for this 
thesis would not be played first, in order to let the participants to adjust to the experimental 
environment.  
 
3.3. Experimental Characteristics 
 
Following the conventions of experimental economics (e.g., Hertwig & Ortmann 
2001), and to increase the external validity of the experiment, our participants were motivated 
by earnings based on their decision-making. Specifically, the amount that every experimental 
subject received was based on the results of one game only, which was selected randomly at 
the end of the experiment7. The selection of the pay-off relevant game was indeed random and 
performed in a manner that was transparent to the participant for the reasons mentioned in 
Ortmann & Hertwig (2002)8. 
The earning of each participant was the pay-off from a particular cell of the randomly 
selected game multiplied by CZK 10 (the matching scheme will be explained bellow). The 
subjects also earned CZK 100 as a show-up fee. The average earning per participant was 
about CZK 210. The earnings ranged from CZK 160 to CZK 330 and in total CZK 6850 was 
paid out.9 Each experimental session took about 45 minutes, including the explanation of the 
instructions and paying out the earnings. 
In order to pay the participants, a random matching scheme was used to match them, 
in other words, after the experiment session Row and Column Participants were randomly 
matched in couples. In these couples, the chosen strategies of the randomly selected game 
were compared and based on the outcome, the pay-offs were determined. 
                                               
7 At the end of both sessions, one game was drawn by one of the participants and all participants in the session 
received their pay-offs based on this particular game. 
8 In Ortmann & Hertwig (2002) the authors argue that leaving the subjects with a possible feeling of deception 
might cause both random as well as systematic error variance in the data. 
9 All values include the show-up fees 
 
 - 15 - 
 
 
Nevertheless, this scheme was strictly used only to transparently motivate the 
experiment participants. The following method was used for the evaluation of the results: 
 For each game the frequency distribution of Row and Column choices was 
constructed. Furthermore, to obtain an average outcome occurrence rate for every outcome, 
the strategy frequency rates of the two strategies resulting in the given outcome were 
multiplied. The advantage of this method is that the results are not influenced by a matching 
scheme that might cause some kind of side effects (for example the random effect of a 
random matching scheme). 
In the experiment, abstract instructions were implemented. This means that the SRO 
was labelled Row Participant and the Government was labelled Column Participant (The 
players were of course switched in the transposed games). SRO’s low probability strategy was 
labelled Strategy A and high probability strategy as Strategy B. Government’s low probability 
strategy was labelled Strategy C and high probability strategy as Strategy D10. Abstract 
instructions were implemented so as not to influence the experimental subjects by any factors 
other than utility maximization through their decisions. Had concrete labelling been used, 
subjects might assume that the Government should behave differently from the SROs, which 
is an undesirable factor for the results of the experiment. 
   
 
 
4. Results  
 
Looking at the experimental results, I do not study only the behaviour of the SROs and 
Government. Apart from the main hypothesis related to the DFH model I also study whether 
participants’ choices differ when they play as Row and Column Participants. My conjecture 
was that subjects find it harder to make choices when choosing between columns than when 
choosing between rows.  
For each game I analyse the outcome frequencies and chosen strategies based on the 
participant type. As mentioned above, I order the specific games so that both Column and 
Row Participants make the same decisions in the same order. Therefore, I can study whether 
there is an impact of the participant type (Participant Row or Participant Column) on the 
results. I will further on refer to this type of study as ‘layout analysis’.  
                                               
10 For games not related to the DFH model, the players and their strategies were labelled in the same way, so the 
players couldn’t recognize the DFH related games from the others. 
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4.1. The DFH Game Results 
 
The DFH Game is the most important game for the examination of the DFH model. As 
mentioned in section 2.7, the DFH Game is a coordination game with two pure-strategy Nash 
equilibria and one mixed equilibrium. In the mixed equilibrium, SRO plays LP with 0.5 
probability and HP with 0.5 as well. On the other hand, the Government plays LP with the 
probability of 0.0625 and HP with 0.9375. Regarding the Nash equilibria, Outcome 3 is a 
both risk and pay-off dominant equilibrium. This outcome is also proposed by the DFH model 
and therefore theoretically, it is likely to be the outcome that results from the experiment.  
 
-- Figure 6 -- 
 
Figure 6 sums up the results of the experiment. In this table the game is depicted three 
times. The first part (labelled OVERALL) represents the results for all participants, the two 
following parts represent the result only for the Row and Column Participants, respectively. 
In each part, the pay-off matrix is reproduced (large, bold numbers) and the pure-strategy 
Nash equilibria are shaded horizontally. Furthermore, the figure shows the frequency of each 
strategy played by each player (on the left of the pay-off matrix for the SRO and above the 
pay-off matrix for the Government) and the average outcome frequency in the grey cells for 
each outcome. The outcome with the highest average outcome frequency is shaded vertically. 
Therefore, when the highest outcome takes place on a Nash equilibrium outcome, the cell is 
shaded in a somewhat squared pattern. This type of table will be also used for the analysis of 
the results of the following games. 
In the overall results of the DFH Game, Outcome 3 was selected in 73% of cases. This 
is both in line with the game-theoretical prediction (Outcome 3 is the risk-dominant and pay-
off dominant Nash equilibrium) and the DFH model prediction (The SRO should choose the 
high probability of investigation to pre-empt the entrance of the Government in the sector, 
and afterwards the Government will enter only with the low probability). It is interesting that 
none of the 30 participants chose the Low probability of investigation when playing the SRO. 
This can be justified by the fact that the incentive was not very high (a participant would have 
to assume that the Government would play the high probability, and in that case he would be 
1 unit better-off when moving from 12 to 13). Also, the expected pay-off of Low is 7.5 
 
 - 17 - 
 
 
whereas the expected pay-off of High is 13.5. Another factor influencing the participants is 
the fact that there is a possibility of earning nothing, when selecting the low strategy, which 
might have a strong psychological effect.  
The action choice was not as straightforward for the Government decisions. In total, 
the participants played 73 % in favour of the predicted strategy (that is Low; expected pay-off 
of Low is 19). Nevertheless, a fair portion of participants played High (27 %; expected pay-
off is 19 as well). High strategy was the more secure strategy, ensuring a pay-off of 18 
whereas by choosing Low the participant faces the risk of obtaining only 15 (but of course the 
possibility to reach the highest pay-off 23). Despite the fact that the expected pay-offs were 
equal and the High strategy was the safer choice, the majority of participants chose the Low 
strategy. This can be explained by having a sample of risk-seeking participants, which is quite 
improbable. More likely, the participants managed to think about the choices of the other 
player and predicted that the SROs will be more willing to play the High strategy, which the 
SROs actually did in all cases.  
When studying the results with regard to the player type, there is no change for the 
SRO strategy, since all participants played High, but we see some difference for the results of 
the Government choices. Participants played the predicted strategy (Low) more frequently 
when being the Row Participant (80%) than when being the Column Participant (67%). From 
these results we might assume that Participants Column had more problems reading the pay-
off matrices as less of them chose the predicted strategy. An alternative explanation is that 
more risk-averse participants were in the group playing columns. 
It is possible to use statistical tests on the frequency of action choices for the DFH 
Game based on the player type. Specifically, I perform three tests using the Statistica 8 
software by Statsoft. The first test is the parametric T-test for two independent samples, 
testing the equality of mean values of the Row and Column samples11. I will also use the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and Mann-Whitney test, both being non-parametric tests of 
equality of distribution. For all statistical tests I will use the common level of significance of 
5%. In the T-test, the null hypothesis is the equality of mean values in the two samples. In the 
                                               
11 This test assumes equality of variances of the two samples. The Statistica software automatically tests this 
assumption and therefore there are 2 p-values in the result table. The first p-value is for the T-test itself and the 
second p-value is for the test of equality of variances to see whether the assumption is valid. If the second p-
value is lower than the common level of significance 5%, we cannot use the results of the T-test because the 
assumption is not fulfilled.  
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other two tests, the null hypothesis is the equality of the distribution of the two samples. The 
same statistical analysis will be used for the other game results in the following sections.  
The statistical test results are in Figure 7. There is nothing to test for the SRO, because 
all participants chose the same strategy. P-values of all tests for the Government are higher 
than 0.05, and so we can conclude that statistical analysis doesn’t prove any significant 
differences in the choices based on the player type. 
 
-- Figure 7 -- 
 
To conclude the analysis of the results of the DFH Game, the results support the 
prediction of the DFH model for an important parameterisation. Specifically, as predicted for 
this parameterisation, based on the experimental results, the SRO will attempt to pre-empt 
regulatory action.  
 
4.2. Alternative Pay-off Game Results 
 
The Alternative Pay-off Game has similar characteristics as the DFH Game, because it 
only introduces an alternative pay-off of 5 for the SRO in Outcome 1. The Alternative Pay-off 
Game is a coordination game with two Nash equilibria and one mixed equilibrium. In the 
mixed equilibrium, SRO plays LP with 0.5 probability and HP with 0.5 as well. On the other 
hand, Government plays LP with the probability of 0.09 and HP with 0.91. Regarding the 
Nash equilibria, Outcome 3 is a both risk and pay-off dominant equilibrium. 
Analysing the results of the Alternative Pay-off Game is interesting with regard to the 
DFH model because the game only changes one small assumption in the model. This 
assumption in the DFH model is that agents cannot earn an alternative profit when the deal 
with the customers does not take place. In reality, when we look at this problem from a more 
long-term point of view, the security brokers can also get established elsewhere when deals 
do not come. Therefore, it is justified to introduce an alternative pay-off for the agents when 
the deal does not take place. This alternative establishment of the agent is more costly and 
takes a longer time, therefore I introduced the alternative pay-off equal to one third of the 
alternative pay-offs of customers. 
 
-- Figure 8 -- 
 




Figure 8 depicts the results of the experiment for this game. The results are similar to 
those from the DFH Game with no alternative pay-off for the agent. Once again, Outcome 3 
takes place in most of the places (64%), so that even after the introduction of the alternative 
pay-off the DFH model statement is still true.  
On the other hand, interestingly after introducing 5 instead of 0 as the SRO pay-off in 
Outcome 1, there has been one participant who found this difference so relevant, that he or 
she switched to the Low strategy when playing the SRO.  
When looking at the results based on the participant type, the trend is the same as in 
the DFH Game. Participants tend to choose the predicted strategies more when they play as 
Row Participants (Outcome 3 takes place in 68% of cases) rather than Column Participants 
(60%).  
 
-- Figure 9 -- 
 
The results of the statistical tests are in Figure 9. All p-values are higher than 0.05, 
therefore we do not reject the null hypothesis of equivalence of mean values (distributions). 
  
4.3. Alternative Parameterisation Game Results 
 
The Alternative Parameterisation Game is a game with 1 Nash-equilibrium. Low 
probability of investigation is the dominant strategy for both players and therefore 
theoretically Outcome 1 should dominate in the results. The expected pay-offs for the SROs 
are 13.5 for Low and 12.5 for High and for the Government 27.5 for Low and 21 for High.  
When looking carefully at the pay-offs of the Alternative Parameterisation Game, 
there is not much difference in Outcomes 2, 3 and 4 compared to the DFH Game (the 
differences in the pay-offs of the Alternative Parameterisation Game and the DFH Game are 
stated in Table 1). 
On the other hand, since the alternative parameterisation allows deals between agents 
and customers when the low probability is set by both the SRO and the Government, there is a 
large difference in Outcome 1, which becomes the only Nash equilibrium of the game. 
 




Table 1: Differences in the pay-offs of the Alternative Parameterisation Game and the DFH 
Game 
15 , 13 -1 , -2 
-1 , 2 -1 , 2 
  
The results of the Alternative Parameterisation Game are stated in Figure 10. The 
alternative parameterisation changes considerably both the game theoretical prediction and 
the experimental results. The predicted result – Outcome 1 – takes place in 90 % of the cases. 
Outcomes 2, 3 and 4 take place in 6 %, 3 % and 0 % respectively.  
 
-- Figure 10 -- 
 
As in the previous 2 games, participants chose the theoretical results in more cases 
when playing rows (93 %) than when playing columns (87 %). 
The result of 90 % occurrence of Outcome 1 is a meaningful fact for the assessment of 
the DFH model. This game predicts different results of the SRO - Government bargaining and 
most participants followed these incentives and chose Outcome 1. Therefore, I conclude that 
the SRO - Government bargaining depends on the model parameterisation. Especially, on the 
fact whether or not trading takes place in Outcome 1, therefore, the key factor influencing the 
outcomes of the games is whether the parameterisation allows the Agent Incentive Constraint 
(AIC) to be valid in Outcome 1. 
 
(AIC)     u(w2 – z(w2)) ≥ p(w1)u(max[w2 – z(w1) – x(w2, w1),0]) + (1 - p(w1))u(w2 – z(w1)) 
 
The AIC is valid when it is better for the agent to report truthfully than lie. If it doesn’t 
hold, then the customers do not accept contracts with agents. In the DFH Game, the AIC did 
not hold in Outcome 1 and the participants shifted to the Outcome 3 of high self-regulation 
performed by the SRO. In all my parameterisations I assume that when agents cheat they face 
the highest possible penalty with regard to their budget constraint: 
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x(w2,w1) = w2 – z(w1) = 40 
 
Therefore I can rewrite the AIC as follows: 
 
(AIC)*    u(w2 – z(w2)) ≥ (1 - p(w1))u(w2 – z(w1)) 
 
Moreover, I took the assumption of u being a simple linear function u(y) = y and 
obtained the following result: 
 














Therefore, in my model transformation the AIC depends on the parameterisation of the 
cash flow w, contract function z(w) and the probability of investigation if the low outcome is 
reported p(w1). 
Once again, I continue with the statistical analysis of the player type performance for 
the Alternative Parameterisation Game. The result of the statistical analysis is in Figure 11. P-
values of all tests are higher than 0.05 and therefore we do not reject the null hypothesis of 
equality for any test. 
 
-- Figure 11 -- 
 
4.4. Prisoner’s Dilemma Results 
 
In the following section I will analyse the results of other games put into the 
experiment. These games are not related to the DFH model and were used mainly to make 
experiment participants familiar with the experimental environment. Nevertheless, we can 
take advantage of the collected data to support the layout analysis. Therefore in the following 
analysis I focus especially on the difference in actions based on the participant type. Also, I 
no longer call the players ‘SRO’ and ‘Government’ but ‘Player 1’ and ‘Player 2’. The 
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strategies are no longer called ‘Low Probability’ and ‘High Probability’ but ‘Strategy 1’ and 
‘Strategy 2’. 
As every economic textbook says, the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game has only one Nash 
equilibrium, occurring when both players ‘give away’ each other (Strategy 2 in my depiction 
of the game). Therefore, game theory predicts the highest occurrence of Outcome 4. 
 
-- Figure 12 -- 
 
Experimental results are provided in Figure 12. In 78 % of cases, the predicted 
Outcome 4 takes place. An interesting result is that in this case, when dividing the choices 
based on the participant type, Column Participants were closer to the theoretical prediction 
with 93 % of choices taking place in this outcome. The difference of the average occurrence 
for the two player types is quite high. Row Participants chose Outcome 4 only in 64 % of the 
cases, therefore the difference of Outcome 4 occurrence for the two player types is nearly 
30 %. 
An interesting fact is the ‘good’ performance (in the sense of game theory prediction) 
of Column Participants when playing Player 2. In this situation all 15 of them chose to play 
Strategy 2 – ‘Not cooperating with the other prisoner’. 
 
-- Figure 13 -- 
 
The statistical results are in Figure 13. Even though all of the p-values are higher than 
0.05, sometimes they are very close to the level of significance. For Player 1 this occurs in the 
test of equality of variance, where the p-value reaches the value of about 0.088. We do not 
reject the null hypothesis of equality of variance but it is close. Nevertheless, in this case we 
can move to the other two tests that do not reject the null hypothesis of equality of distribution 
of choices.  
Furthermore, for Player 2 choices the p-value for the T-test is about 0.07. Once again, 
I do not reject the null hypothesis for these tests, however, the result is not so straigtforward. 
Looking carefully on the Player 2 results of the experiment, we see that the Column 
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Participants did a better job than the Row Participants as regards the game-theoretical 
prediction. Therefore, based on this fact, even if there were a statistical significance in the 
differences of choices, it would not be in favour of our above-mentioned hypothesis saying 
that it is easier for the Row Participants to handle the pay-off matrices than for the Column 
Participants. 
 
4.5. Game of Chicken Results 
 
The Game of Chicken represents the situation of American bored youth playing a 
game, during which two of them drove cars towards each other and the one who ‘chickened 
out’ and avoided the crash first lost. Strategy 1 represents chickening out and driving off the 
road and Strategy 2 represents driving straight. When both players choose Strategy 2, the cars 
crash. The game has two Nash equilibria in Outcomes 2 and 3. 
 
-- Figure 14 -- 
 
The results of the experiment are in Figure 14. The Nash equilibrium in Outcome 2 is 
the most frequent with 32 % of occurrence in all three cases (overall, Row, Column). On the 
other hand, Outcome 3 is the least frequent with 19 %, once again in all three cases. Small 
differences of outcome percentage (with respect to participant type) occur only between 
Outcome 1 and 4.  
 
-- Figure 15  -- 
 
The small differences in player type performance are supported by the results of the 
statistical analysis (Figure 15) as well, where some of the p-values, especially for the Mann-
Whitney test, are very high. 
 
4.6. Battle of the Sexes Results 
 
The Battle of the Sexes Game is a coordination game with two Nash equilibria in 
Outcomes 1 and 4. The difference between the pay-offs in the Nash equilibria and the two 
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other outcomes is very high (the sum of pay-offs of the Nash equilibria outcomes is 52 and 
the sum of pay-offs of the two other outcomes is 14), so the participants should be very 
motivated to achieve the coordination equilibria. As shown in the results (Figure 16), they 
succeed only partially as 35 % led to Outcome 4 and 35 % led to Outcome 2.  
 
-- Figure 16 -- 
 
Statistical tests on the differences in the player type performance are summarized in 
Figure 17. All p-values are higher than 0.05 and therefore there is no statistical difference 
based on the player type. 
 
-- Figure 17 -- 
 
 
4.7. Stag Hunt Results 
 
The Stag Hunt Game is a coordination game with 2 Nash equilibria in Outcome 1 and 
4. The results of the game are in Figure 18. The results of this game have the most dispersed 
results of all 7 games in the experiment. The overall numbers put the highest frequency to two 
outcomes equally: Outcome 3 and Outcome 4 with an average occurrence frequency of 27 %. 
For Column Participants, Outcome 3 is the most frequent with 36 % of occurrence frequency 
and surprisingly, for Row Participants it is Outcome 2 with 32 %. This means that when 
regarding the decisions separately, the participants did not manage to reach the Nash 
equilibria with better pay-offs with the highest occurrence. A Nash equilibrium was only 
reached when determining the outcome frequencies for all players together and yet the first 
place occurrence was shared with another ‘non-Nash’ outcome. 
 
-- Figure 18 -- 
 
As we see both from the statistical results (Once again, the p-values of the test are not 
below 0.05, but they are quite low for Player 1, reaching about 0.15 in the T-test. See Figure 
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19) and from the experimental results, the disparity of the outcome frequencies is caused 
especially by the performance of Player 1. Player 1 played Strategy 1 and Strategy 2 with the 
ratio 60:40 as Row Participant and 33:67 as Column Participant.  
 
-- Figure 19 -- 
 
4.8. Discussion of the Results of DFH Non-related Games  
 
Since in all four DFH non-related games (Prisoner’s Dilemma, Game of Chicken, 
Battle of the Sexes and Stag Hunt) are games where coordination is a key element of the 
players’ behaviour, we cannot conduct a detailed analysis as only one shot games with no 
communication among players were allowed.  
Nevertheless, an interesting result is the ‘good’ performance of the participants when 
playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma, as 78 % of outcomes took place in the non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium. This might be caused by the fact that experiment participants were economic 
students, and all of them probably covered the theory of this very famous game. 
The results from the Prisoner’s Dilemma game can be compared with the results in 
Chen & Hogg (2006) where the authors conduct 860 one-shot games with the results of only 
about 45 % of played games ending in the non-cooperative equilibrium. 
Authors of a different paper (Battalio, Samuelson, Van Huyck, (2001)) conducted an 
experiment to analyse the behaviour in the Stag Hunt game. Even though this experiment did 
not implement a one-shot game (75 rounds of the game were played), after the first round, 
39 % of outcomes took place in the outcome, which I label Outcome 1 and which took place 
in 23 % of cases in my experiment. 
All together, it is not easy to compare the results of the DFH non-related games in my 
experiment, as other authors use different implementation details, and even though the results 











In this paper I place the DFH model to an experimental test when transforming the 
model to a simple 2-player, 2-strategy coordination game. The results indeed support the 
hypothesis that for certain parameterisations SROs set higher regulation to lower the entrance 
of the Government on the market (supported by the results of the DFH Game and the DFH 
game with alternative parameterisation). 
On the other hand, for certain parameterisations of the model both players prefer to 
choose low regulation of the securities market (supported by the results of the Alternative 
Parameterisation Game).  
The vital element determining the outcome of the DFH parameterisation is the Agent 
Incentive Constraint, which for my model transformation depends on the parameterisation of 
the cash flow w, contract function z(r) and probability of investigation of the agent if the low 
cash flow is reported p(w1). 
Therefore, I conclude that the SRO – Government bargaining is a very difficult 
process, involving a lot of factors. Market forces of coordination and anticipation of the other 
player’s performance influence this process, and particularly, the SROs might set higher 
regulation than what is favoured by the agents in order to pre-empt the Government to set its 
regulation. 
As to whether the player performance depends on the player type, at first glance, the 
results might seem to support the fact that Row Participants followed more the theoretical 
prediction as all three DFH related games results prove. Nevertheless, this is not valid for the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma where the Column Participants performed ‘better’ according to game 
theory. Most importantly, statistical tests used for the player performance based on the player 
type do not find any significant differences between the two groups. 
Therefore, based on the experimental results I cannot confirm the hypothesis that 










6.1. Appendix 1 – Experimental Results and Statistical Test Results 
Figure 6: DFH Game Results 
Government 
Frequency of Low probability Frequency of High probability OVERALL  
73% 27% 













Frequency of Low probability Frequency of High probability ROW PARTICIPANTS 
80% 20% 











     
Government 
Frequency of Low probability Frequency of High probability COLUMN PARTICIPANTS 
67% 33% 











     
      Nash equilibria   
      Most frequent outcome  
      Average outcome frequency (Product of frequency of the 2 particular strategy resulting in the given outcome 








 - 28 - 
 
 
Figure 7: DFH Game - Statistical Test Results 
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Figure 8: Alternative Pay-off Game Results 
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Figure 9: Alternative Pay-off Game - Statistical Test Results 
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Figure 10: Alternative Parameterisation Game 
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Figure 11: Alternative Parameterisation Game - Statistical Test Results 
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Figure 12: Prisoner’s Dilemma Results 
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Figure 14: Game of Chicken Results 
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Figure 15: Game of Chicken – Statistical Test Results 
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Figure 16: Battle of the Sexes Results 
Player 2 
Frequency of Strategy 1 Frequency of Strategy 2 OVERALL 
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Figure 17: Battle of the Sexes – Statistical Test Results 
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Figure 18: Stag Hunt Results 
Player 2 
Frequency of Strategy 1 Frequency of Strategy 2 OVERALL 
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Figure 19: Stag Hunt – Statistical Test Results 
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Welcome, and thank you for participating in our experiment on interactive decision 
making. In the experiment you will earn money depending on your behaviour and that of 
other participants you will be matched with. The earned money will be paid to you, in cash, 
right after the experiment. Please do not talk during the experiment. If you have a question, 
please raise your hand and wait for an experimenter to come and answer your question. 
 
You will participate in a series of interactive decision situations (“scenarios”), Each 
such scenario will involve you and another participant. Each of you will have two options to 
choose from. If you are Participant “Row”, you choose between actions (“rows”) A and B. If 
you are Participant “Column”, you choose between actions (“columns”) C and D.  
 
You, like every other participant in this experiment, will be randomly assigned to be a 
“Row” or “Column” participant. You will participate in 14 interactive scenarios of the kind 
described above. 
 
Your earnings depend on which outcome is selected. Each outcome is represented by a 
cell in the tables of outcomes shown in the Illustration below: If, for example participant Row 
chooses A and participant Column chooses D, outcome 2 is selected.  
In each cell, under the label “Outcome …”, there are two numbers separated by 
comma. These two numbers represent the earnings of the Row participant (always the first 
number) and of the Column participant (always the second number), respectively. If, for 
example, Outcome 2 were to be selected, then participant Row would earn ‘g’ and participant 







Your earnings from this experiment will be based on the results of only one scenario, 
which will be determined randomly at the end of the experiment by one of you. You will be 
randomly matched to a participant from the other group and the outcome of the scenario will 
Outcome 4 
k , l 
Outcome 3 
i , j 
Outcome 2 
g , h 
Outcome 1 
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be selected. The earnings from the thus determined scenario will be multiplied by 10 and you 
will obtain the particular amount in Czech crowns. In addition, each of you will obtain a 
show-up fee of 100 Czech crowns. 
 
Before we start the actual experiment, let us go through a Sample Scenario to make sure that 
everyone understands how to read the earnings tables. Assume that each participant were to 
try to maximize their earnings, what should they choose? Please circle the actions in the 
Sample Scenario for both players (i.e. A or B for participant Row and C or D for participant 
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6.3. Appendix 3 – Experimental Sheet – Row Participants 
 
You are participant Row. Please circle your actions in the 14 following scenarios.
6 , 717 , 2
3 , 1410 , 10
0 , 122 , 9
6 , 2315 , 13
12 , 152 , 3








B 12 , 1815 , 23




9 , 99 , 4








12 , 1815 , 23
13 , 200 , 15
11 , 2014 , 25
12 , 2215 , 28
7 , 614 , 3
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18 , 1220 , 13







B1 , 023 , 6
9 , 2213 , 15
18 , 1220 , 13
23 , 1515 , 5
15 , 124 , 5







B9 , 99 , 3
4 , 913 , 12
20 , 1122 , 12
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6.4. Appendix 4 – Experimental Sheet – Column Participants 
 
You are participant Column. Please circle your actions in the 14 following scenarios.
C                D
1 2
3 4
7 , 614 , 3
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